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Introduction
This document reports on the Epinet workshop on the making of robot autonomy, held
in Utrecht 16-17 February 2014. The workshop was part of a case study focused on
developments in this  area,  in particular,  autonomy for assistive robots in care and
companionship  roles.  Our  participants  were  of  relevant  expertise  and professional
experience: law and ethics,  academic and industry robotics, vision assessment and
science  and technology studies (STS).  The workshop was intended to explore the
expectations of robot autonomy amongst our participants, against a backdrop of recent
policy views and research trends that  are  openly pushing an agenda of "smarter",
more  dynamic  and more  autonomous systems (e.g.  European Commission,  20081;
EUROP, 20092; Robot Companions for Citizens, 20123). In short, future robots should
be designed for action in the home, in the streets,  in care,  at  work and any other
setting in which they can operate alongside humans and on behalf of them in assistive
roles. Future robots should help address the grand societal challenges in Europe, in
particular, those of an ageing population, sustainable healthcare and welfare.
Robotics  development  is  intimately  connected  with  visions  of  robot  autonomy,
however, as a practical achievement, robot autonomy remains till this day part real,
part promise. Visions of robot autonomy are in part based in fantastical depictions, in
particular,  any  human-like  intelligent  appearances  like  those  found  in  mythology,
folklore and the science fiction genre (e.g. Hephaestus' golden assistants; the Golem;
Asimov,  2004;4 Pixar  Animation  Studios,  2008  5).  Ideas  of  robot  autonomy  are
nevertheless  powerful  societally  and  culturally-specific  visions,  even  if  the  very
notion of "autonomy" is vague and inconsistent in recent accounts of future robots.
These accounts still come together with considerable force in directing the efforts of
researchers and experimenters, for example, in establishing funding priorities. They
have  a  function  in  strategic  planning  for  future  developments  and,  thereby,  for
attending  to  particular  scientific  and technological  problem domains.  Accounts  of
future robots are also  informing and shaping the efforts of legislators, ethicists and
lawyers. To that effect, one can say that there is an official vision of future robots, a
yardstick with which everyone implicated in robotics development has to measure
their expectations.
1 European Commission (2008).ICT Research. The Policy Perspective: European robots, getting 
smarter, safer, and more sensitive. European Commission.
2 EUROP (2009).Robotics Visions to 2020 and Beyond - The Strategic Research Agenda for 
Robotics in Europe, 07/2009. Coordination Action for Robotics in Europe (CARE).
3 Robot Companions for Citizens (2012).MANIFESTO. More than machines. The RCC consortium. 
http://www.robotcompanions.eu
4 Asimov, I. (2004). Robot Visions (short stories and essays, 1940-1989). New York: Roc. 
5 Pixar Animation Studios (2008). WALL · E: Computer-animated romance science fiction film. Walt 
Disney Pictures.
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With  these  considerations  in  mind,  our  workshop  proceeded  by  addressing
thematically defined areas of interest to our case study:
 Robot autonomy: which perspectives are endorsed to shape and 
develop the [official] vision?
 Robot autonomy: which perspectives shape ethical and legal 
frameworks?
 Future robotics: who should participate, and which knowledge-domains
should be included to shape policy visions?
In  the  following,  we  report  and  expand  on  our  analysis  of  presentations  and
discussions  during  this  two-day  event.  Among  other  things,  we  observe  how the
official vision is challenged, what the concrete ethical and legal issues are and what
lies ahead for interdisciplinary collaborations in this field.6
First day – Robotics
Which perspectives are endorsed to shape and develop the [official] vision?
Three questions were circulated beforehand to a group of roboticists who were invited
to  address  them  one  at  a  time  in  brief  presentations,  followed  by  rounds  of
questioning and discussion.
 How do you perceive of the vision to create autonomy in robotics 
systems used for care and companionship?
 What purposes will be served by pursuing this vision?
 Which are the main professional challenges faced by yourself in 
engaging with the vision to create more autonomous systems for care 
and companionship?
The three questions were intended to hone in on the ways in which roboticists, in their
everyday practice,  relate  to,  reason about  and operationalise  robot  autonomy.  The
main  findings  presented  here  are  grouped  thematically  into  three  sections,  each
addressing  a  set  of  concerns  about  the  relationship  between  robotics  and  wider
6 The report is based on written notes from the workshop, and so is paraphrasing most of the 
arguments and discussions. Direct quotes are used in a few instances where text has been taken 
from presentation documents. This is indicated accordingly.
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society,  including  ethics  and  law.  Previous  assessments  of  the  making  of  robot
autonomy – by Epinet partners – also feature into the accounts we give of the events
on the first day, i.e., in our own reflections on the relationship between the two.
1.  Roboticists relate strategically to robot autonomy in their daily
work, be that in teaching, research or clinical care work.
It should come as no surprise that presentations reflecting on what to expect of robot
autonomy were quite different one from the other. Roboticists ground their approach
in  their  respective  research  speciality,  professional  background  and  experience,
research aims and ongoing projects.  They all  spoke of  'intelligence',  'adaptability',
'learning'  and  other  manifestations  of  machine  'smartness'  and  potentially  greater
autonomy, but each had different concerns to share, emphasis, and so on. 
We provide an account of these reflections,  ordered under three headings:  clinical
work, basic research, and experimentation, each of which is chosen pragmatically and
informed by self-identification and the focus of the work of these roboticists.
a. Clinical work.
Two of the roboticists work in clinical and therapeutic settings, and this background
serves to structure the way they imagine and describe autonomy. 
Roboticist 1 works with therapeutic robots, especially for children with autism, but
also elderly sufferers of dementia. He described autonomy as relational, and as a bit
hybrid. It is partly about control, partly like magic or make-believe, like the Wizard of
Oz. Hence, the user experiences the robot as autonomous, but the autonomy is only
partial and always a function of relations: The researcher is never really out of the
loop but remains ‘hidden in the closet’ during the treatment sessions. 
The  robot’s  appearance  is  important  to  the  user’s  experience  of  the  robot  as
autonomous.7 The user must also like the robot, and for this purpose the system itself
must be adaptable. Roboticist 1 emphasised different degrees of adaptability, referring
to  both humans and robots.  This  is  expressed in  ways in  which  the  patient-robot
relation may dynamically evolve: the human adapts and/or the robot adapts, thus they
enter into a process of mediation with uncertain outcomes. This process touches upon
core value judgements, such as relations with other humans, religion, righteousness,
7 What Epinet researchers have termed the make-believe.
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and more, some of which is illustrated, for example,  in the movie  Robot & Frank
(2012), where a robot is turned into a thief by its owner.
Roboticist  4  (electrical  engineer,  roboticist)  works  with  children  recovering  from
traumatic brain disease and injury. To him, autonomy appears as what needs to be
administered to the kids. Similar to Roboticist 1, the concept of autonomy is described
by Roboticist 4 as thoroughly relational: The autonomy of a robot is described as the
capacity to evolve and adapt to the needs of individual users in order to increase its
effectiveness  and  improve  the  engagements  with  it.  For  instance,  the  robot  may
remain active or calm,  depending on the need of a child  (patient).  This,  however,
presupposes that robotic devices have access to data on the children (patients) they
interact with and built-in capabilities to act upon such data in pre-defined ways. In
this  way,  the  autonomy of  the  system hinges  on  the  amount  of  data  there  is,  on
processing capability and processing desirability.
Roboticist  4 specifically  described  his  work  as  'applied  science'  where  the  main
challenge was not so much the development of new robotics technologies but rather
the use of existing ones: the technology needs to be affordable and working, rather
than novel and innovative. They use Google and smart phones, integrating standard
elements into the larger systems that have been compiled for therapeutic purposes.
Hence,  the definition  of  autonomy is  not  only a  function  of the relation  with the
patient but also of the state of the art in robotics (and related technologies) working
together in real-life settings.
b. Basic research.
Two roboticists  could  be  described  as  working  on  basic  research,  although,  they
engage with real-world robotics and real-world problems. Rather than attending to the
specific needs of some user category, they orient themselves toward general research
problems and principles, the making of 'enabling technologies', potentially useful in
all types of robotic applications. Their notion of autonomy is intertwined with these
orientations to robotics development.
Roboticist  2 situated the questions of autonomy within the philosophy guiding his
research group. Seeing robotics as an integration of science, engineering and society,
they define autonomy in terms of rational, social and intelligent behaviour. Central to
this is the question of how the robot performs affect, emotion and reasoning: how can
the robot be capable of reading the actions of humans, and translate into actuation of
one action among possible options? If so, can robots then be intentional agents? 
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One example he took was how a robot develops a set of rules based on body scheme
generalisations,  i.e.,  abstract  knowledge  about  the  behaviours  of  the  human/user.
Robot rationality could be derived from learning from a mapping of successes and
failures,  involving  the  capacity  of  the  robot  to  generate  from  that  new  paths  of
behaviour.  Robot  sociability  could  be  understood  as  the  ability  to  perform
(autonomously) culturally-specific tasks, such as the etiquette of handing over a knife,
with the handle facing the recipient. Roboticist 2 spoke in this respect of control (low)
level,  signal  level  and  a  higher  signal  processing  level,  the  key  complications
emerging when translating between them.
Roboticist 3  started out by saying that he has been trying to explain to his students
what autonomy is, but it turns out to be very difficult. He tried to ground the question
of autonomy in the (broader) question of 'what is a robot',  therefore,  proposing to
define  autonomous  robots  as  intelligent  machines  capable  of  certain  degrees  of
learning and interaction.  Insofar as this is the case, robots may not be completely
different from humans. According to him humans can be seen as intelligent machines
and  robots  can  be  seen  as  electro-mechanical  machines.  This  he  described  with
historical  examples of  automatons  (e.g.,  the  automated  rooster,  flute  player,  the
Karakuri  doll),  and  electromechanical  automatons  through  to  self-parking  cars.
Referring  to his  work at  Waseda,  Roboticist  3 used the example  of robot-assisted
medical training systems possessing a kind of intelligence. Other examples he took,
include different kinds of assistive robotics with cognitive and perceptual capabilities,
or  bodily-kinaesthetic  capabilities.  A fundamental  problem with  all  these  systems,
according to Roboticist 3, is a persistent conflict. When machine intelligence goes up
user friendliness goes down. Autonomous robots may approach one or another form
of 'intelligence' but this comes at the cost of that intelligence not being well suited for
human-machine interactions. On the one hand, robot intelligence is seen as similar in
principle to human intelligence. On the other hand, there is a problem in building such
intelligence into functional robotic applications. The question therefore, is whether it
is only a matter of time before science and technology (such as AI) can provide better
solutions to overcome this problem or whether the conflation of human and machine
agency, as essentially of the same nature, is a blind alley.
c. Experimentation.
Roboticist 5 was the only participant to explicitly address the question of autonomous
robots as a vision for policy, which he saw as politically over-determined and flawed.
He also addressed an alternative vision of autonomy, attempting to take into account
both the technical and ethical aspects. For this reason we have termed his contribution
experimental, since it did not fit easily into a specialised robotics area. Seeing the
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political  official  vision  as  erroneous,  he  advocated  scaled-down  expectations  of
autonomy.  According  to  Roboticist  5,  semi-autonomous  robots  could  be  hugely
beneficial if very carefully and ethically developed. The minimal autonomy is defined
as the ability to decide what to do next without human intervention. What we rather
need is relative,  controlled autonomy. Controlled autonomy is still  commanded by
humans. This notion he further expounded with reference to the concept of dynamic
autonomy which  is  based  upon Sheridan’s  (1980)  scale  of  10  gradual  degrees  of
autonomy (from full input from a human to no input). According to this presenter, it is
hard to conceive of applications with which we would want to relinquish all human
control or intervention. A robot should at least be smart enough to figure out when it
is in trouble, and so call for humans to respond. Different degrees of autonomy have
also  been  coupled  with  notions  of  ethical  responsibility  to  categorize  what  could
possibly constitute ethical robotic agents.8
From these different accounts we learn that roboticists qualify autonomy in ways that
can  be  rendered  functional  within  their  professional  practices,  experiences  and
projects. Their views do not resemble any grand (political) vision. Rather, they set out
goals and purposes for robots that actually converge to some degree, as we will now
turn to.
2.  Envisioning aims and purposes and encountering problems.
It  appears  that  the  problem-domains  encountered  by  roboticists  vary  significantly.
Those working in clinical setting are immediately confronted with ethical problems
and  social-psychological  considerations.  Basic  research  is  preoccupied  with  the
particularities  of  technical  obstacles  and  opportunities.  And,  the  experimental
approach to autonomy lacks sufficient institutional support to move forward.  But, it
should be underscored that  we encountered considerable convergence of aims and
purposes.  This is  exemplified  by the ways in  which the roboticists  come up with
similar lists of goals, including (in no particular order):
 To enable and promote dignity, security and quality of life (e.g. by 
robots taking care of certain hygiene tasks)
 To enable elderly persons to live independently, care for themselves 
and stay at home
 To reduce costs and increase savings in the care services 
8 See for instance https://philosophynow.org/issues/72/Four_Kinds_of_Ethical_Robots
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 To free up care and other professional capacity by relieving 
personnel of routine tasks
 A kind of meta-distinction underscored by several participants was the 
question of whether robots in new situations and environments will 
cause isolation and loneliness, or whether they can support sociability 
and mobility. This is a valid concern that can be taken into account in 
assessing robotic applications in practice, and it points to the value of 
supporting sociability and connecting people.
Pursuing  these  purposes  gives  rise  to  particular  practical,  technical  and  ethical
problems. Participants discussed scientific and technological problems. They spoke of
robotics  as  an  'enabling  technology',  however,  in  many  cases  also  linked  with
ethically-relevant  considerations.  According to the distinction between clinical  and
basic  research,  roboticists  working in  basic  research emphasised the technical  and
scientific difficulties, while clinical practitioners were more sensitive and outspoken
of ethically-relevant  problems. Relations  with publics on such issues were seen as
important, yet difficult. As one participant put it, robot autonomy scares people. Yet,
participants in the workshop shared perceptions of what the problematic issues are,
even if they see and articulate them differently. All were in favour of more ethical
investigation and debate relating to robot autonomy,  and all  were,  in principle,  in
favour of improved communication with publics. Most (or all) also seemed positive
about the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) programme of the European
Commission but were not necessarily clear on what it entails in practice (most of the
roboticists  only  heard  about  RRI  from  Epinet  researchers  or  the  ethicists/legal
scholars who were present on the day).
a. Technical problems.
Roboticist  3  drew attention to the problem of building 'smarter',  more autonomous
systems which then are not user-friendly. Similarly, the requirement of affective and
emotionally intelligent interaction, introduces endless difficulties. A possible solution,
according  to  Roboticist  3,  would  be  strategic  research  efforts  across  the  human
sciences and artificial intelligence (AI). He argued that research in the human sciences
– here meaning AI – is trying to abstract human intelligence into encoded machine
functions. But, this approach was critiqued (by Epinet researcher 1 and Ethicist 2) for
conflating human and machine agency, and for not being specific enough about how
they each can and cannot  be considered autonomous.  There is  no solution on the
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horizon  for  overcoming  the  problem  of  how  to  build  human-like  agencies  into
machines.
On somewhat similar terms,  Roboticist 2 appealed to the higher functions of being
rational, social and intelligent, as the ultimate source of purpose and aim. But, the
project to construct a translation between the two in robotic systems has not been
achieved so far, as pointed out by Epinet researcher 1. Even if we take it for granted
that one or another higher-order purpose can be built into a robot, there is still the
problem  of  translating  purpose  into  lower-level  tasks  for  execution  in  specific
settings. According to Roboticist 2, in moving from the high level to the low, there are
so  many  constraints,  including  also  emotional  constraints.  According  to  him,  this
complexity has not been resolved in machine execution.
Finally,  Roboticist  5,  among  others,  underscored  a  central  problem  with  more
automated operations in human-centred environments, namely the unstructured and
complex character of such environments as opposed to the structured confinements
for which earlier generations of robots were built (and still are in manufacture). He
emphasised how safety problems emerge in unpredictable environments, and how any
human environment is per definition unpredictable.  
b. Ethical issues.
Ethical  problems  pertain  to  adaptability and  learning,  and  how  human-robot
communication  is  mediated.  According  to  Roboticist  1 this  can  be  seen  as  the
downside of adaptability:  where do the dynamics and emergent properties take the
user/the system? He specifically underscored how adaptability and adaptiveness may
lead to conflicts with moral standards and belief systems. As an example, the question
was  posed  whether,  for  instance,  a  robot  could  convert  to  [some  religion]  from
whatever it has been taught. According to him, adaptiveness is a key issue with the
highest ethical stakes.
Roboticist 2 highlighted how robots can destroy ecosystems of care. In this way the
technology  can  create  more  problems  than  it  solves.  In  connection  with  that,
Roboticist 5 argued that we should get rid of the fetish that technology is the only
answer to human and social problems.
Several participants also mentioned the problem of dependency and the formation of
emotional ties with robots. Roboticist 1 mentioned the example of the little dinosaur
(a robot) – and children learning to walk. His daughter developed a relationship with
the dinosaur. He posed the question of whether such a relationship entails a loss of
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relations with other children? He also mentioned how such questions become more
pressing as systems become more advanced.
Problems were further  raised about  dependency on standards  and already existing
technologies such as Google and smart phones, as well as the connection with military
research. Following the presentation by Roboticist 4 in which autonomy was tightly
connected  to  information  gathered  about  the  needs  of  patients,  Ethicist  2 asked
whether,  in  the  case  of  relying  on  Google,  it  would  not  be  better  to  restrict  the
autonomy of the system. The implication was that Google has significant problems,
especially relating to privacy, but there is also the more general issue of who is in
control of any given system. The question then becomes what we mean by autonomy
in systems whose functions depend on global conglomerates.  Following up on this
argument,  Roboticist 3 noted how Google bought Boston Dynamics, and how there
are close relations between Google and military robotics. There are many problems
relating  to  these associations.  As for the use of ‘standard elements’,  for example,
Aldebran robotics (US) customize robots to look for information.  Roboticist 3 then
asked what kind of information exactly these robots are looking for. 
At a later stage in the workshop, Roboticist 4 commented directly upon this problem
of robots harvesting information, specifically as it pertains to the privacy of patients.
Since all the robots in question are connected to the internet, that’s a lot of medical
information  being aggregated  and disseminated  online.  This  raises  serious privacy
challenges for Roboticist 4 and his team. 
Overall, throughout these discussions, privacy and data protection kept coming up as
a concern for most participants.
c. Coding ethics into robots.
During the discussions someone brought up the idea of encoding ethics into robots,
akin to Arkin's proposal for military robots and Asimov's three laws. Although such
ideas  have been around for a long time,  the view was expressed that  this  is  now
becoming a pressing need due to recent advances. But, unless such encoding is kept
very simple, designing reliable ethical conduct into robot behaviour is likely to be
even  more  complex  than  that  of  translating  higher-order  aims  into  lower-order
commands for robot executions. Also, as asked by Epinet researcher 5: who should
encode the norms into the robot? How will the norms apply in different domains of
society, granted that different domains display very different logics and mores?
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3.  Assessing the official vision.
In  posing  our  first  question,  we  invited  the  roboticists  to  position  themselves  in
relation to a vision of robot autonomy, e.g., the one promoted by the Horizon 2020
programme and the public-private partnership (PPP), RockEU. As we have seen, most
roboticists did not do so directly. Rather, they relate to the question of robot autonomy
with reference to their research environments and everyday practice.
Participants  confirm  that  there  is  no  single  idea,  nor  a  simple  concept  of
'autonomy'  for  robotic  systems,  corresponding  with  the  official  vision.  For
example,  Roboticist 2 talked about how there are different notions of autonomy, and
how these are mostly implicit rather than explicit. Roboticist 5 stated that there is no
one vision of autonomy for robotics systems. He even sees an extraordinary level of
confusion, and especially so in the contexts of care. He expressed grave worries about
the situation in Europe, arguing that European policy makers have come to regard
robotics as a solution to ageing, which he described as a disaster based in erroneous
ideas of what robotics can and cannot deliver.
The general view was that the problematic aspects of robotics development lack a
proper forum for discussion and problem resolution. Roboticist 3 drew our attention to
what  he  referred  to  as  a  huge  discussion  in  the  EU  on  autonomous  robots  for
healthcare and home care. He underscored that there are problems of communication,
however,  he  did  not  explain  in  great  detail  what  those  problems  consist  of.  To
paraphrase his main point, it is difficult to translate – carefully and ethically – how to
explain the pressing ethical and social problems to those in power, mainly business-
people and politicians.
These and similar accounts we heard, are indicative of the vagueness of what robot
autonomy can stand for as a practical achievement—particularly of the purposes to
which  to  put  future  robots.  Even  if  the  official  vision  describes  'smarter',  more
dynamic and more autonomous systems, there is nothing to indicate that roboticists
have  a  'master'  idea  of  which  technical  and  scientific  problems  need  solving  to
achieve a particular version of robot autonomy for the purposes intended by policy-
developers  and politicians.  Rather,  it  appears  that  various  kinds  of  autonomy  are
implicitly understood amongst roboticists with no obvious link to the official vision.
We learn from the roboticists that visions of robot autonomy are primarily political,
often driven by influences roboticists have little if any control over, in their own view.
Working to resolve the practical and concrete problem domains is common practice,
of which researchers can take some ownership. Other problems (ethical and socio-
cultural) beyond the influence roboticists can have, are perhaps better addressed in
ethical  and (possibly)  public  discussions.  Some of  our  participants  also  described
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important  developments  being  beyond  their  reach,  such  as  the  push  for  greater
autonomy  to  replace  human  labourers  which  then  results  in  considerable
unemployment. When an Epinet researcher raised the question of unemployment, we
were reminded of a whole history of labour redundancies in a number of application
domains.
Roboticist  3 replied that the problem of human replacement  and unemployment is
beyond the control and influence of roboticists. He illustrated this with the case of
Swedish forestry work which is highly specialised, yet the country does not have the
human  resources  to  fill  the  jobs.  This  is  where  robotics  can  help,  regardless  of
unemployment.  He  further  argued  that  other  options  may  address  an  underlying
problem of unemployment, however, such options are typically a matter of political
decision-making,  'out of our hands and conditions we cannot change'. 
Setting  aside  issues  of  labour  redundancies  and  unemployment,  participants
confirmed the need to go along with certain aspects  of what  is  expected of robot
autonomy in recent times. This has to do with changes in research funding priorities,
and innovation policy:
Roboticist  5 told  of  a  need to  be  pragmatic,  since  he  has  to  get  grants.  He then
mentioned a tension in the new PPP, where there will be 50% private funding, and so
changing  the  conditions  for  doing  research  compared  to  the  FP7  funding  regime
which was 100% publicly funded. He also noted how the Commission insists on RRI
being hard-wired into project designs with the necessary inclusion of ethical,  legal
and societal expertise. The implication is that we will see all sorts of tensions arise
between the different  actors who are now involved in taking the research agendas
forward.
Summing up.
We learn  that  our  participants  shy away from directly  addressing the  question  of
autonomy as it appears in European policy visions and strategic planning of future
robots. Rather, they relate strategically to robot autonomy on their own terms with
reference to their respective professional backgrounds, experiences and experimental
orientations.  This  way,  roboticists  render  robot  autonomy  manageable.  In  some
instances the problem-domains are very remote from dealings with legal and ethical
complications. It is not as if the roboticists are insensitive to the character of legal,
ethical and societal issues, problem-finding and resolution, but they feel that they lack
the  specific  means  and  institutional  support,  perhaps  also  the  public  trust,  to
effectively address these kinds of complications. 
12
EPINET workshop report: Making robotic autonomy through science, ethics and law?
As can be seen from the exchanges we report on here (although, not exhaustive of all
the issues that came up on the day), there was a general willingness, even a sense of
urgency, to discuss how to approach ethical considerations. Many of the roboticists
already have experience from engaging with ethicists (and ethics committees) and so
are not strangers to many of the ethical and legal complications that can emerge in the
making  of  robot  autonomy.  Yet,  as  for  direct  relations  with  ethics  and  law  we
observed  during  the  workshop  how only  one  of  the  roboticists  embarked  on  the
difficult task of cutting across disciplines, i.e.,  Roboticist 5, with his elaboration of
relative  autonomy,  controlled  autonomy and dynamic autonomy in the creation  of
assistive robots for sensitive care settings. His efforts were well received, for example
by  Lawyer  2  who  stated  how  she  appreciated  the  notion  of  dynamic  autonomy,
because it can be constructively dealt with by lawyers.
There appeared to be some feeling of insufficiency however, over communications
with publics and 'society'. For example, many roboticists have to give serious thought
to  social  acceptance  and,  among  other  things,  they  fear  the  stigmatization  of
machines.  Many also  described a  wish to  communicate  with wider  society,  going
beyond the mere inclusion of immediate users. There seem to be an issue here of
establishing  a  legitimate  venue for  concrete  dialogue  and interaction  over  ethical,
social and public concerns.
Finally, politics was treated with some suspicion by the participants, i.e., any evidence
of imposition and demand that cannot be scientifically attained. The general idea is
that  publics  should  be  included  in  decisions  on  purposes  and  aims  and  on  user
scenarios and application domains, although the available means of communication
could be better known, better adjusted and more effectively used.
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Second Day – ethics, law and governance
On the second day, two questions were addressed by ethicists, legal scholars and 
others with significant investment in ELS issues: 
Question 1: How do ethics and law engage with efforts to increase the autonomy of 
robotic systems for use in care and companionship?
Question 2: what are the main professional challenges faced by yourself in engaging 
with the creation of autonomous systems?
The session which took up most of the day, also included contributions from a 
representative of the recent PPP initiative, euRobotics, whose job is to accommodate 
ELS issues within the new RD&I platform. In the following we elaborate and reflect 
on the main findings  and then move on to the 'Final round of discussion' among all 






The ethicists and legal scholars were clearly used to communicating with roboticists.
All  of  them  were  well  aware  that  the  others  use  and  rely  on  different  types  of
autonomy.  As  could  be  expected,  the  scholarly  strategies  to  ascertain  or  depict
autonomy also differ within ethics and law, and the contributions on the day allowed
for clarifications of those differences among the participants.
Ethics.
Roboethics  is  now a burgeoning field  of  research  which incorporates  a  variety of
ethics  traditions.9 The  variety  of  approach however,  does  not  merely  reflect  upon
different ethical or philosophical traditions, but also the concerns and preoccupations
emerging in their working relations with roboticists and others (lawyers, users, policy
9 A preliminary mapping revealed (at least) the following disciplines and perspectives to be relevant:
Rights and principles based ethics, everyday ethics, pragmatism, (social) psychology, HCI, HRI, 
hermeneutics, virtue ethics, Kantianism, philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, capabilities 
approach, vision assessment, phenomenology, feminist studies, disabilities studies, science and 
technology studies, animal rights, human rights law, privacy scholarship, engineering ethics, 
bioethics, RRI, machine ethics, robo-ethics, participatory TA, foresight.
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makers,  etc.).  The  topic  of  autonomy  (understood  as  self-determination)  is  much
closer to ethicists' most pressing concerns with the use of the term, than to those of
roboticists. But, as the ethicists went on to depict and explain autonomy, they did not
spend much time defining it, except in relation to specific threats or challenges to it.
In short, the participants orient to various relational aspects of autonomy, although,
quite differently from the roboticists.
Ethicist 1 was concerned about the different conceptions of autonomy emanating from
robotics / robot designs, and ethical / philosophical / legal scholarships. Based in the
euRobotics  Green Paper (and Latombe 1991), he defined autonomy simply as the
capability for the 'setting of one’s own goals', however, that is not a realistic design
option. Ethicist 1 argued that roboticists design what are just tasks, not the setting of
goals. Robots capable of setting their own goals would be a contradiction in terms.
Autonomy in robotics  is  always derivative  and always handed down from human
planning and design. As he explained, the contradiction of goal-setting robots appears
in different guises which renders difficult communication between ethicists, lawyers
and roboticists. For example, in the work leading up to the Green Paper, the main
problem  was  for  the  lawyers  to  understand  exactly  what  the  roboticists  were
conveying about autonomy and related issues. This contradiction will also resonate in
relationships  between  (autonomous)  robots  and  humans.  There  are  fundamental
differences between the actions and relations of robots and humans, which Ethicist 1
illustrated with movie clips, showing degrees of what appears autonomous. Speaking
about deception, he explained that autonomy is not merely a matter of authenticity.
There is a machine triggering a kind of response/action. It is more subtle than that –
perhaps, for any given application we should compare what we used to do and what
we now can do with the machine,  keeping in mind that the complexity of human
relations is not a real relational task for a robot. Humans and robots are different in
kind, but this difference tends to be ignored due to the similarities in many individual
tasks humans and robots undertake. Consequently, the gradual expansion of robots
throughout  society, coupled  with  the  propensity  to  anthropomorphize  them,10 may
pose a danger to our perceptions of human autonomy and relations, and of robots in
society. On a different note, robots capable of action in unstructured environments
will scare people so, for such purposes, great care needs to be taken. To summarize, a
key message from Ethicist 1 was that autonomy generally means something like free
will among publics,  philosophers and lawyers.  We therefore need to communicate
very carefully in talking and discussing autonomous robots who actually have no free
will.
10 Roboticist 2: from where comes the humanness?
Ethicist 1: from the delegation of human tasks to machines.
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Ethicist 2 did not proceed from a classical ethics-based understanding of autonomy.
She proceeded, partially at least, on the basis of the Roboethics Roadmap in which
autonomy  is  defined  in  a  way  that  is  quite  straightforward  for  roboticists  to
understand,  i.e.,  autonomy as  the capacity  to  learn.  Learning is  a  prerequisite  for
social / assistive robots to work  socially, but we also see a certain readiness—that
people can increase their capabilities in and through the use of assistive robots, i.e., if
implemented wisely. According to ethicist 2, machines mediate, and this is how their
autonomy (learning capacities) are perceived. Also, inspired by works in science and
technology studies (STS) she rejected classical notions of individual agency as the
basis  for  assessing  human  autonomy.  Rather,  autonomy  needs  to  be  seen  as  a
capability of peoples in communities.11 The FP6 project, Cogniron, was mentioned
here as an example of such an approach. However, autonomy in robots raises other
challenges,  mainly  due  to  their  unpredictable  behaviours.  Ethicist  2 argued  that
unpredictability leads to gaps in claims to liability. Adequate laws are important here
but not sufficient. There is also a moral responsibility to establish throughout a whole
chain of responsibilities. Referring to the works of Sheila Jasanoff (e.g. on the Bhopal
disaster), she described how efforts to rectify and compensate for damages induced by
technoscience,  raises  meta-questions  about  the  overall  design of  our  societies.  An
adequate learning process here for society on the whole, would consist in efforts to
restore the situation to its previous state, while learning how an innovation produced
the disaster in the first place. In short, seeking to increase the autonomy in robotic
systems  with  learning  robots,  will  have  to  approach  the  community’s  collective
capacity to deliberate and accommodate in the best possible way, both the dangers and
the potentials.
Ethicist 3 briefly argued that autonomy implies being a master of your own destiny.
The notion was not further expounded upon but used to pose the question of how
robots  affect  perceptions  of  human  autonomy.  This  is  explicitly  a  human-centric
approach insofar as the target of the question is the implications for humans (users
and  others  as  well  as  creators  and  manufacturers).  Ethicist  3 did  not  treat  the
definition or exact meaning of autonomy, but left it implicit in his presentation, while
using the term to point back (reflexively) at the people making and using robots rather
than at the robots themselves. In this account, with cues taken from hermeneutics and
phenomenology, autonomy is  relational  insofar as the mediation of abilities  at  the
11 In our interpretation, ethicist's 2 position was based in a mix of communitarian ethics, robotics and 
science and technology studies. Neither of these exclude a strong position on autonomy, but require
that it is qualified in terms of community/social relations and the ways in which these are mediated
through machines.
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very interface with the technology, remains of central importance. The same goes for
the relevancy-constraints in which the question of autonomy arises and the ethical
issues associated with it.  Ethicist 3  claimed that we need to pose the question if the
purpose is  to 'unveil  the secrets  of embodied intelligence';  to help people; to help
helpers; or if the purpose is to solve societal  and economic problems. Against this
background, he outlined a number of ethical problems that relate to robot and human
autonomy, but that are not limited to it. For example, western healthcare already has a
number  of  problems  without  robots.  Loneliness  and  a  lack  of  self-mastery  is  a
problem among the elderly and the quality and ethics of care are faulty. The quality
and ethics of human-robot relations are uncertain, as well as the relationship between
device-use and identity. Automation continues to come at the loss of skill and human
dignity is under pressure, with or without machines. 
Law.
Topics raised by the two legal scholars on the day, included questions such as: do we
need to change existing laws and principles to accommodate for autonomous robotics,
or can we adapt existing principles to the new cases? What about relations with other
disciplines  and  with  governance?  Will  law  have  to  depend  on  them to  a  greater
degree? What about the autonomy of law? Both presenters remained ambivalent. On
the one hand, they were trying to accommodate for new challenges to law. On the
other hand, they were trying to stick with the inherent positivism and conservative
aspects  of  law.  This  could  be  seen  clearly  insofar  as  both  of  them  put  forward
proposals,  such as  'electronic  personhood'  and 'autonomous  systems as  authors  of
creative  works',  but  later  expressing  doubt  or  downright  criticism  about  those
proposals. Both presenters were practitioners of civil law,12  not human rights lawyers
or privacy lawyers. Hence, there was something of a distance to the ethicists, since
civil law may possess fewer tools for dealing with concepts such as dignity or self-
determination. Whereas law remains much closer to the human subject than robots as
subjects, it does not define the key concepts of autonomy and agency, dignity, self-
determination etc., except in ways that can be legally qualified.
Lawyer 1 specialises in civil law with a strong interest in questions relating to non-
human agency and liability. She was involved in the writing of the Green Paper on
robotics. She started out by pointing to the fact that law is very human-centric, and
that the human is the first subject of the law. A central focus was the shortcomings of
the existing  European Liability  Directive  and tort  and liability  regimes.  Lawyer 1
12 Dealing chiefly with matters such as corporate and business, family law, tort and liability.
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argued that we may have to change the law or look for new legal principles since a
robot cannot be treated simply as a thing. Possible analogies considered in addition to
'things'  included  animals  and  children.  Yet,  due  to  unpredictable  events  and
environments these entities are not within the control of the person in charge. She thus
encouraged the others to consider the chain of involved parties, such as: modellers of
robots, producers, programmers, owners, users, teachers. The chain is increasing and
product liability is not sufficient. We may therefore have to create a new legal status
for robots, that of electronic personhood. Resources for trying to address this problem
were taken mainly from two resources: first, the notion of legal personhood already
enshrined  in  corporate  law;  secondly,  previous  thinking  (Solum)  about  Artificial
Intelligence  and software  agents.13 A second (complementary)  possibility  included
more  interdisciplinary  and  organisational  measures,  for  example,  ethicists  or
technology  assessors  working  for  each  company,  and  commitment  to  privacy  by
design  and  by  default.  Referring  to  the  emerging  General  Regulation  on  Data
Protection, she highlighted the example of how regulation is mandatory and emerging
from a legal regulation. Yet, even as Lawyer 1 proposed these possible solutions, she
remained sceptical about their feasibility and/or necessity.
Lawyer 2 also works within civil law but focusing especially in IPR related issues.
Her presentation oscillated between two different notions of autonomy. First, there is
the question of robot autonomy, which was not investigated in full but rather focused
on  the  question  of  intellectual  property  rights  for  machine-generated  works.  She
provided  several  examples  of  such  works.14 There  are  different  opinions  within
different  legal  regimes:  The European Court  of Justice has upheld the notion that
work must be created by a real person to be protected, whereas the UK common law
provides  incentives  also  for  machine-generated  works.  This  presenter  remained
sceptical  about  the possibility, but  found it  interesting,  theoretically  speaking. Her
preferred  concept  of  autonomy was  Roboticist's  5 dynamic  autonomy but  how to
adapt this to IPR did not become clear.15 Secondly, there is the question of autonomy
of and for the law. What is autonomy for law? According to  Laywer 2 it does not
really exist, save through attributions of legally relevant acts. In general, this presenter
13 A possible problem here is that these lack characteristics normally used to identify agency, such as 
personhood, soul, etc. According to Lawyer 1 this is not so from a legal perspective. However, we 
may pose the question whether this conclusion would be as straightforward from the perspectives 
of human rights law or privacy law.
14 Such as Harold Cohen’s Aaron, David Cope’s musical experiments, Patrick Tresset’s drawing 
machine, the works of Anna Mura & Leire Guerela.
15 Roboticist 5 told that in parts of his research on evolutionary robotics he sees evolution of new 
behaviours not even conceived by humans by the time they appear. There is thus a distance 
between the human creator and the creation. Here the matter seems to be not so much the property 
rights as such but rather the (im-)possibility of holding someone responsible. 
18
EPINET workshop report: Making robotic autonomy through science, ethics and law?
was in favour of law proceeding stepwise and in a conservative manner: We should
think carefully before we introduce new concepts. Law is a normative instrument that
always has to  balance  different  considerations  and values to find the optimal  mix
between innovation, protection of weaker parties, welfare, sustainability, problems of
ageing  populations,  etc.  Still,  law comes  under  pressure,  she  claimed,  and law is
always reactive. It cannot be created outside of societal processes. She argued that
there is a real danger here because industry will push too hard for certain laws to be
passed. To this claim, Epinet researcher 3 replied that calling law instrumental is only
one side of the coin. There are also the fundamental rights and freedoms, which can
be used creatively.
PPP representative.16 One  representative  from the  newly  founded  PPP joined  the
workshop on the  day. His  background  is  in  robotics,  and he  has  worked  for  the
robotics company CEA-LIST, doing research into AI and applied uses of robotics in
hazardous environments, manufacturing and health care. He is now in charge of the
ELS activities of the PPP. He explained autonomy as the capacity of a machine to
execute tasks independently from human interventions. In order to do so, the machine
needs to be capable of learning, generalization and action. Within the PPP there is no
one solution to how to bring about robot autonomy. Rather, there is openness toward
all kinds of technical solutions. He sees autonomy as especially relevant in the field of
health care and assistive technologies for the elderly, but also as a requirement from
the legal field, from which he mentioned the examples of non-contractual liability and
labour law. Autonomy must therefore be seen as a broad umbrella-term that seeks to
capture the efforts  of several disciplines.  The aim of the PPP is  to become world
leader,  a  goal  that  can  only  be  reached  if  a  number  of  hindering  obstacles  are
overcome.  Examples  of  such obstacles  are  non-harmonized  legal  frameworks  and
markets in Europe, protectionism, problems addressing non-contractual liability, and a
lack of clear answers from societal actors on how industry should proceed to promote
robotic  technologies.  Another  problem is  the  poor  levels  of  appreciation  for  ELS
issues  inside  the  robotics  community.  This  is  also  a  pressing  concern  since  poor
communication and misunderstandings with society can lead to the stigmatization of
robotics. Europe should aim to become world leader also in ELS issues. The PPP aims
to  take  a  broad  and  inclusive  approach  to  ELS  issues,  as  exemplified  in  a  new
coordination action called Rock EU. This project offers the possibility, through its
topic group on ELS, to create links with the other topic groups inside the PPP for
collaborative purposes. He invited ELS practitioners to take part in this work.
16 This presenter could have appeared in the roboticist session on the previous day as well. However, 
he only arrived in time for the ethics/law session.
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2. Facing problems
The disciplines of ethics and law come under pressure from robotics development,
and  they  are  challenged  by having  to  rely  on  roboticists  as  their  main  source  of
knowledge about current and future research trends. Another form of pressure comes
from working within 'unhealthy'  power structures, where many practical real-world
problems are not  informing decision-making. While  the ethicists  in  this  workshop
related  their  views  to  philosophically-based  understandings  of  autonomy,  the  key
issues they emphasised were based in very similar kinds of social and technological
interdependencies as the ones faced by makers and users of robots. Some of these
dependencies pose a threat to human autonomy and to social cohesion, they argue.
The lawyers, on the other hand, proceeded quite differently, given the need to qualify
their  analyses in terms of legally relevant acts and principles. Their  analyses were
brought up against the limits  of existing legal practices and principles,  sometimes
triggering a search for new concepts and institutional arrangements. 
There was a general sense that, given time and opportunity, many of these problems
could be worked out. Learning takes place between ethicists, lawyers and roboticists.
Also, both ethicists and lawyers repeated some of the same problems addressed by
roboticists as 'politics interfering with their work'. Participants spoke of the unhealthy
reliance on top-down decision making in the EU, as well as too strong an influence of
business interests and drive toward competitiveness:
Ethicist  1 argued that  the problem is  not robotics or robots,  rather, it  is  powerful
people who think this is a solution to the problem of ageing.
Lawyer 2 argued that there is a real danger to law insofar as industry will push too
hard, and try to shape the law to its own ends.
According to  Ethicist  2,  Europe is  controlled  too much from the top.  Relating  to
ethics, this results in a doubly moralistic attitude, a 'Jesuit attitude'. On the one hand,
Europe elevates  ethical  principles  to the highest  status.  On the other  hand, it  will
simply order society around, and seemingly without any respect for those very same
principles. 
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The push from above which many of the participants mentioned, is problematic as
well in terms of the pressure it places on roboticists to seek public acceptance of their
robots amidst cultural  fears or even a stigmatization of them.  Ethicist  1 called for
extreme  care  being  required  in  communicating  real  potentials  and  limits  in  the
application of robotics,  and in carefully  working out the ethical  and social  issues.
Ethicist 2 argued that ethics and law are the prime sources to support expressions of
public concern, however, that is not enough. The question was raised, how the EC will




Both  the  ethicists  and  the  lawyers  proceeded  to  propose  solutions,  e.g.,  to  better
protect  human  autonomy  and  social  cohesion,  to  improve  interdisciplinary
collaborations and institutional arrangements, and possibly include larger parts of the
public  for  improved  public  relations.  Among  the  main  proposals  in  this  vain,  we
summarize the following:
Standardization and standardization bodies.
Along  with  the  recommendation  of  more  bottom-up  decision-making,  ethicist  2
proposed specifically to focus efforts on the development of standards. She claimed
that  roboethics  principles  must  be  shaped  by research  and development  from the
bottom up, while it is still too early to state definitely what the principles should be.
Regarding  the  ISO,  roboethics  principles  should  be  matched  with  specific
standardizations… In her opinion, standards will be very important in implementing
better tools to address the social and ethical issues relating to robotics.
Integrating technology assessment, ethics and law into robotics 
projects.
Several participants from different professional backgrounds, expressed their support
for a proposal put forward by  Lawyer 1, suggesting better integration of ethics and
technology  assessment  into  robotics  projects.  The approach could  be  toward self-
regulation,  however, made mandatory through law. The ongoing work on the new
General  Data  Protection  Regulation  (GDPR) was  mentioned  in  this  respect  as  an
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example  of  best  practice—how  to  establish  an  ethical  code  of  conduct  including
engineers, philosophers and lawyers. She posed the question of why we do not think it
obvious that there should be at least one ethicist working for each company. Again it
was argued that this seems to be the approach taken in the GDPR proposal which
introduces, for example, privacy by design, privacy by default, etc.
Allowing for public concerns to be expressed bottom­up. 
Better public engagement and more consultation were held up as important means to
improve  robotics-society  relations  (similar  is  proposed  in  the  report  Taking  the
European Knowledge Society Seriously, 2007).  Lawyer 2 mentioned the example of
Dutch media authorities implementing a panel including citizens, and how that was
given more importance than voices of bureaucrats and politicians. Ethicist 2 argued in
favour of such activities in relation to standardization work; she also argued in favour
of much stronger emphasis on Europe’s young people and their ideas being reserved a
place at the table. 
Final round of discussion – Implications for innova­
tion and governance
In  this  section  we provide  a  summary of  the  discussions,  based  on written  notes
whereby  the  contributions  are  paraphrased,  not  quoted.  It  is  difficult  to  sum the
discussions  up  in  terms  of  some  particular  direction  of  debate.  Our  participants
addressed different issues in no particular order, some of which engendered response,
some which serve as standalone comments. This illustrates quite well the character of
the deliberations as they took place across the different disciplinary domains. In the
next  (and  final)  section  we  sum  up  the  overall  conclusions  from  the  workshop,
including what we see as key implications for governance. 
Ethicist  1:  I  want  to  highlight  two things:  1)  There is  a  strong incentive  to  keep
humans in the loop. Regulations could be used for restricting (robot) autonomy in
certain domains, such as military robots. 2) Technology Assessment (TA) emerges as
a tool for law, and also as a way of increasing participation from different disciplines.
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Epinet researcher 2: regarding discussions in public fora - there is a pressure to speed
up public discussion. For example:  I attended another workshop on robots for the
police – 35 civil servants and researchers. There was a willingness to skip basic rights
entirely under pressure to speed up the discussion. We are still in a kind of a utopian
phase – people are blinded by possibilities, we don’t see the negative sides.
Epinet researcher 4: I agree with what Epinet researcher 2 says. We are supposed to
advice Brussels – they want a tool/tech fix to deal with discrepancies and conflicts of
disciplines.  In this  kind of format  (i.e.  this workshop) discussions have been very
good. In situations of lopsided power relations, the quality of the exchange is lesser.
How  to  transport  this  kind  of  wisdom  to  inform  and  change  the  culture  of
communication? It is a struggle.
Ethicist 2: In my view, Europe is too much controlled from the top. In other places
you have younger people inventing, and such innovation is not shaped by the usual
top-down forces. We need to unleash the powers of the young in Europe. To think,
apply and invent, it does not require a lot of money.
Epinet researcher 1: given the expectations created within the policy environment, the
tendency is to simplify – what problems are relevant, etc. The Epinet challenge to
decision and policy makers is an exercise in deliberative complexification – questions
of which issues  could be raised. We need more effort – there are no final solutions.
Honesty about occupational capacities – this is the real ignorance everywhere. We
need honesty and transparency.
Roboticist 1: In the future we need more people that are generalists in this field, -to
combine more perspectives. We need people who can serve as guardians of robots. In
care  situations  (&  consumer  issues):  to  oversee  issues  and  problems,  connect
responsibilities  and situations  (example:  the blind owner. For  children,  -if  parents
cannot take care then others need to see to it that they are taken care of). 
Roboticist 3: I worry about EU support for assistive robotics, taking place without the
possibility to adequately discuss 'what is a robot' - people have too high expectations
of what robots can do. We as researchers need to make it clear that there are many
things that robots cannot do and that there are many problems that cannot be solved.
But due to the structure of funding we need to sell ideas. I like lawyer 2’s idea about
philosophers/ethicists  working  in  the  companies  /  research  labs.  They  can  make
clearer the limitations of what robots can do and what they cannot do.
The aim of the present PPP is to make new business work – and this is very risky. 
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Roboticist 2: I’m still excited about this event – I have learned a lot. What became
very clear to me pertains to the use and misuse of words, how they work across fields
and barriers, and this is even more problematic when approaching the public. There is
a great need to involve ethicists and lawyers. I learned a lesson: we need to be careful
about how we use words.
Lawyer 1: This kind of interdisciplinary forum is really important – we need more
funding for this kind of research. Our centre for instance is really under-funded. We
are  in-between  fields  [law+STS],  it  is  difficult  to  exist  in-between  conventional
disciplines.
Roboticist 4: Robotics can be applied everywhere, so everybody should be included,
especially young people. Many fields are really far away from the roboticist’s point of
view. For instance, medical doctors at a Tufts university workshop were difficult to
engage: doctors are really difficult, nurses are better…
PPP representative: Robotics is one of the main tech revolutions for the coming age.
We need to anticipate, to provide a framework that is clear and simple – to become
leaders in the world. There is a meeting of the PPP on March 12 – you are all invited –
we will  work practically  on issues of how to take ELS issues into account  in the
program. I agree with lawyer 1: a main problem is financing – it is difficult to bring in
the ELSi people – we need to fund and reinforce this.
Roboticist 4: What do you think about adding ELSi competencies to technical fields? 
PPP representative: The ELSi people should be included, and also lead some actions,
as in Robolaw. We are not aiming to exclude anybody. We are trying to define the
important things to be done in the PPP. As for the problem of jobs: robotics creates
more  jobs  than  it  destroys.  If  we cut  unskilled  labour  we need  to  see  how such
elements can be brought into account. 
Epinet researcher 3: To raise the issues of the role of law. Do we have the proper tools
for doing our jobs well? Regarding the normative fields [hard/soft law], it seems that
law is under transformation, both law and legal scholarship. As a knowledge form –
how does it play out against TA or other related practices such as privacy by design,
impact assesments, etc?
Roboticist  5:  I  am very  mindful  of  the  dangers  of  robo-exceptionalism.  Still,  the
following seem to me to be peculiar to the field:
– the unrealistic expectations
– robots have agency
– robots provoke emotional attachments and dependencies
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1. As for future EU projects in H2020 and the PPP: they should not be approved
unless they address societal actors, sustainability issues, etc.
2. The  time  has  come  for  us  to  treat  robots  as  we  treat  clinical  trials  and
experiments  on  human  subjects.  Specific  ethical  approval  should  be
recommended.
3. The  question  of  impact  on  jobs.  I  would  like  to  see  companies  and
manufacturers undertake a social compact. For every job that is removed the
company undertakes to re-train or redeploy that person. If not, they can pay a
tax. Replacement costs will have to be found in welfare budgets. 
Epinet researcher 1: That is very radical, since it goes against the grain of the policies
of the day.
Roboticist  5:  As it is now, the private sector gets richer and the public sector gets
poorer.
Roboticist 1: There is a race to the bottom between different legislatures. Regulation
will  have to take place at  EU level,  at  the very least.  Cf. also the concept  of  in-
sourcing in the US, where manufacturing is brought back.
Roboticist  2:  SMEs  would  be  scared  even  more.  Socially  speaking  I  agree,  but
economically…it could perhaps apply to big factories.
Epinet researcher 4: What is work, and what is work going to be in the future?
Ethicist 2: Robots could be cleaning up the Atlantic Ocean: just think about it.
Conclusions
Drawing  together  the  conclusions  reached  over  the  two  days,  there  is  no  single
meaning, use or scientific content to be associated with the concept of autonomy for
robots.
Insofar  as  robot  autonomy is  conceived  as  major  contribution  toward solving  the
grand challenges of an ageing society and sustainable healthcare, the official vision is
flawed.
Autonomy for robots – insofar as it can be put to meaningful use – and autonomy for
humans are not the same thing. Autonomy for robots is always derived from human
concerns and interests. Forgetting or ignoring this could lead to undesirable social and
ethical consequences.
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We learn how differently roboticists, ethicists and lawyers conceive of autonomy. One
common trait  is  that  all  conceive  of autonomy as  relational,  and never  as  a free-
standing property of either humans or machines.
Roboticists  and lawyers tended towards seeing the ethical and societal  issues arise
along the trajectories of gradually increasing robot autonomy. This was different to
the  ethicists  who  tended  towards  situating  autonomy,  human  subjectivity  and
community at the centre of their analysis. We identify a lack of attention in the law to
human rights and privacy, the branches of legal scholarship that are closer to ethics
articulations. This has been pointed out in the Roboethics Roadmap, but has not been
much emphasised in the more recent ELSi activities of EUROP and euRobotics.
In  spite  of  the  many  differences  in  approach  and  orientation,  there  were  clear
indications  that  participants  –  most  of  whom  are  experienced  in  c-disciplinary
exchanges about ethical and societal  issues – were quite capable of relating to the
practices, ideas and concepts of each other. 
Provided ample time and opportunity, many ethical and social issues could be better
worked  out  across  the  disciplines  present  in  this  particular  workshop.  There  are,
however, serious constraints in terms of time, opportunity and funding. 
Perhaps the most taxing issue that kept cropping up is how many see their practices,
the values  and goals they are meant  to  serve (better  care,  human dignity, smarter
robots,  improved  human-machine  interactions,  etc.)  as  pressured  by  top-down
structuring and control of innovation agenda setting and funding priorities. It is quite
possible that these tensions will be further accentuated by the new PPP.
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into   the   background—that   the   event   afforded   a   more   open   discussion   of   a   range   of
understandings of autonomy, according to who is articulating or demonstrating its workings:
engineers,  philosophers,   lawyers  and other.  We welcomed very  much  the  opportunity   to
discuss   a   variety   of   definitions   and   products   already   competing,   thus,   demonstrating   a
number of ways in which autonomy is defined, enacted and recognised. In this respect, the
event was particularly instructive to our approach. Not only did it confirm some of the findings

















































































































how uncertain the study objects are within this domain of  innovation,  in particular,  that of
autonomy   as   a   problem   domain,   and   what   the   implications   of   that   are   for   future
developments, for policy and regulation, for ethical considerations and so on. In this respect,
the   contributions   of   our   invitees   at   the   networking/embedding   event   as   a   whole   was
particularly helpful to unravel definitions and product examples along with the many ways in
which autonomy is defined, enacted and recognised. The constitution of our case study group
is particularly useful as well, given this focal point of our research. It offers rich material to
legal scholarship, to ethical enquiry and uncertainty analysis—to join up our investigations
and assessment to­date, along with the learnings we take from this networking/embedding
event.
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